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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
The District Court granted Summary Judgment in favor of
respondent Grand County School District and against appellant
Jolene Welch on the grounds that appellant's incapacity to perform contracted services justified respondent's termination of
the parties' employment contract.

The sole issue on appeal,

then, is whether the District Court properly applied the law as
it relates to incapacity and excuse of nonperformance.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is a wrongful termination case.

The District Court

granted Summary Judgment in favor of respondent employer Grand
County School District and against appellant, the employee, on
June 10, 1985. Thereafter, appellant moved the District Court
to set aside that judgment, and requested a hearing on said
motion.

After a hearing on appellant's request, the District

Court agreed to reconsider its ruling granting summary judgment
in favor of respondent.

Upon reconsideration, the District

Court again granted Summary Judgment in favor of respondent
Grand County School District. It is from this final judgment
dismissing her Complaint that appellant appeals.

B.
1.

Disposition in the Lover Court

Appellant filed a Verified Complaint on or about

January 2, 1984.

See Verified Complaint and Summons, copies

attached hereto as Appendix "A."
2.

Respondent answered on or about January 22, 1985 and

filed Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories on or
about April 10, 1985.

See Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's

First Set of Interrogatories, copy attached hereto as Appendix
n

B."
3.

On or about May 13, 1985, respondent filed a Motion to

Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment,
with accompanying Memorandum and Affidavit in support thereof.
See copies of the Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit, attached
hereto as Appendix "C." Appellant filed no objection to the
Motion, no Memorandum in Opposition, and no counter-affidavits.
4.

On May 28, 1985, the District Court issued a Ruling

granting respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, and on June
10, 1985, signed an Order Granting Summary Judgment in favor of
respondent Grand County School District.

See copies of Ruling

and Order, attached hereto as Appendix "D."
5.

On or about June 19, 1985, appellant filed a Motion to

Set Aside Summary Judgment, accompanied by an Affidavit from
appellant's legal counsel and a Memorandum.
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6.

Respondent subsequently filed an Objection to Plain-

tiff's Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Summary Judgment,
accompanied by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment,
with an attached Affidavit of Counsel.
7.

Appellant then filed a Request for Hearing on Motion

to Set Aside Order Granting Summary Judgment.
the hearing for July 31, 1985.

The Court set

See copies of Appellant's

Request and the Court's Notice, attached hereto as Appendix "E.M
8.

At the hearing, appellant's counsel provided the Dis-

trict Court and respondent's counsel with an Affidavit signed
by appellant and with a Memorandum in Support of Request for
Hearing on Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Summary Judgment.

See copies of appellant's Affidavit and her counsel's

Memorandum, attached hereto as Appendix "F."
9.

Following the hearing on July 31, 1985, respondent

filed a Reply Memorandum in response to appellant's Memorandum
referred to in paragraph 8, next above, and a Motion to Strike
Affidavit, requesting the District Court to strike a paragraph
of the Affidavit which was filed with the Court at the July 31
hearing.

See respondent's Reply Memorandum and Motion to

Strike, copies attached hereto as Appendix "G."
10.

On September 6, 1985, the District Court issued a

Ruling Upon Reconsideration of Motion for Summary Judgment,
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wherein the Court granted respondent's Motion to Strike with
respect to the challenged paragraph of appellant's Affidavit/
and also once again granted respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
11.

See copy of Ruling, attached hereto as Appendix "H."

On September 24, 1985, the District Court entered

Summary Judgment against appellant, dismissing her Complaint
with prejudice.

See copy of Summary Judgment, attached hereto

as Appendix "I."
C.
1.

Facts of the Case

In August of 1980, appellant Jolene Welch made appli-

cation to and was hired by Grand County School District as a
bus driver for the school year 1980-81.

In July or August of

1981, 1982 and 1983, appellant and respondent entered into
employment agreements for each of the respective school years
listed.

See Affidavit of Bill Meador, Superintendent of Grand

County School District, and documents attached thereto, copy
attached hereto in Appendix MC."
2.

On September 23, 1983, after approximately one month

on the job, appellant was injured in a work-related accident.
As a result of the injury, appellant entered into the care of a
physician, was not able to continue working, and received workmen's compensation from the State Insurance Fund for the workrelated injury.

See Affidavit of plaintiff, copy attached

hereto as Appendix "F"; Plaintiffs Verified Complaint, supra.
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3.

At the time appellant was injured, she was working

under an employment contract with respondent Grand County
School District.

The term of the contract was for the 1983-84

school year, covering a nine-month employment period.

See

Affidavit of Bill Meador, supra; Affidavit of plaintiff, supra;
Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories, supra.
A.

After appellant's injury in September of 1983, appel-

lant, under doctor's orders, was not allowed to return to work
until after the expiration of the nine-month period of the
employment contract.

See Affidavit of Bill Meador, supra;

Affidavit of plaintiff, supra..
5.

After appellant was injured in September of 1983,

respondent hired a bus driver on a part-time basis to cover
appellant's bus route.

This part-time driver fulfilled all of

appellant's full-time responsibilities, but received none of
the full-time benefits, i.e. medical insurance, reserved for
appellant because of the substitute driver's part-time status.
See Affidavit of Bill Meador, supra; Defendant's Answers to
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories, supra.
6.

On or about January 31, 1984, appellant met with

respondent's Superintendent of Schools, Bill Meador.

At that

meeting, appellant informed respondent that, under doctor's
orders, she could not return to work for an indefinite period
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of time but not sooner than some time after the end of the
1983-84 school year.

At that same meeting, respondent informed

appellant that because of appellant*s inability to return to
work, respondent would fill appellant's full-time bus driver
position by giving full-time employment to the part-time
driver, who had been performing appellant's contractual duties
in appellant's absence for approximately four months.
7.

],d.

Also at the January, 1984 meeting, respondent informed

appellant that respondent would continue appellant's medical
insurance coverage through June of 1984.
8.

Id.

At all times pertinent hereto, Grand County School

District bus drivers were not represented by the Grand Education Association (GEA) in contract negotiations with the District, but were "classified personnel" and subject to terms of
employment separate and distinct from "certificated personnel,"
who were represented by GEA.

Id.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There is no issue as to any material fact.

Appellant and

respondent entered into an employment contract for the personal
bus-driving services of appellant.

Said contract was for a

fixed period of time, the term of the contract being the regular school year of 1983-84.

Shortly after the beginning of

the contract term, appellant was injured in a work-related
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activity and thereafter received workman's compensation benefits for that injury.

Because of the injury, appellant could

no longer perform the services required under the employment
contract.
As a matter of law, respondent was justified in the termination of appellant's employment.

Appellant had not performed

a substantial and material portion of her contract and prospectively could not perform the services contracted for. Appellant's incapacity discharged respondent from performance, terminated the contract, or excused any nonperformance on the part
of respondent.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS NO ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT.
Appellant's Verified Complaint alleged that appellant's
employment contract with respondent Grand County School District included the following: (a) appellant's "employment was
for an indefinite term"; (b) employment contracts would be
tendered to appellant on an annual basis "provided her work
performance was satisfactory"; and (c) "as long as her job performance was satisfactory" appellant had "job security" with
respondent.

See appellant's Verified Complaint at 1f1[ 5, 6 and

8, copy attached hereto as Appendix "A."
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Respondent moved the

lower court for dismissal, arguing that, based upon these allegations, the termination was not actionable under the employment-at-will doctrine, which currently is the law in Utah.

The

lower court, however, did not rule upon this motion to dismiss,
nor did it respond to the legal argument supporting it.
Rather, the lower court ruled on respondent's alternative
motion for summary judgment, which motion was based upon the
law of contracts as it relates to incapacity and excuse of nonperformance.
Subsequent to the lower court's order granting summary
judgment, appellant admitted by Affidavit and in Memorandum of
legal counsel that the employment contract in question was for
a definite term, the 1983-84 school year.

See Affidavit of

plaintiff and Memorandum in Support of Request for Hearing on
Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Summary Judgment, copies
attached hereto in Appendix "F."

According to the law, the

employment-at-will doctrine generally applies only where the
employment contract is for an indefinite term.
v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979).

See Bihlmaier

Admission by appellant

that her employment contract was for a definite term of approximately nine months (the normal school year period), in contradiction to the allegations of her Verified Complaint, reinforces the wisdom of the lower court's original decision to
avoid application of the employment-at-will doctrine and the
motion to dismiss based thereon.
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Thus, there is no dispute of fact with respect to the term
of the employment contract.
respect to the following:

There is also no dispute with
(a) approximately one month after

the employment period began, appellant received a work-related
injury; (b) said injury required professional medical attention; (c) as a result of said injury, appellant was unable to
continue her contracted employment, and thereafter received
workman's compensation payments; (d) respondent hired a parttime bus driver to perform the services called for in appellant's contract, but could not provide this part-time driver
with the benefits associated with full-time contract status;
(e) after approximately four months' time, wherein the parttime substitute performed the appellant's full-time contractual
responsibilities, on or about January 31, 1984, appellant met
with respondent's Superintendent of Schools, and informed him
that she was under doctor's orders not to return to her busdriving responsibilities until after the close of the current
school year; (f) at that same meeting between appellant and
respondent's Superintendent, the Superintendent informed
appellant that respondent would hire the part-time substitute
bus driver as a full-time replacement for appellant, but that,
as a benefit to appellant, respondent would continue appellant's insurance coverage through June of 1984.
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Appellant argues that a factual dispute exists with respect
to the policies of respondent school district in offering
annual employment contracts to satisfactorily performing noncertificated, classified district employees such as bus
drivers-

Appellant's Brief at p. 6.

Appellant attempted, by

affidavit, to establish as fact consistent with this argument
certain employment policies of the respondent.

The lower

court, however, granted respondent's Motion to Strike the paragraphs of appellant's affidavit which attempted to set forth
such policies, and the court's granting of the motion is not
here appealed.

There are no counter-affidavits or other admis-

sible evidence disputing the facts regarding these policies, as
these facts are set forth by respondent, and no factual dispute
exists with respect thereto.

The policies of the respondent

district are clearly enunciated by respondent's Answers to
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and by the Affidavit
of respondent's Superintendent.
Appellant also argues that evidence regarding the terms of
the employment contract in question was not heard by the lower
court, and that this mandates reversal of the summary judgment.

Appellant's Brief at p. 5.

Complaint in December of 1984.

Appellant filed her Verified

Prior to the time respondent's

Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary
Judgment was filed in May of 1985, appellant sent written
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Interrogatories to respondent, the answers to which gave
details of the terms of the contract, and appellant had sufficient time to engage in other discovery.

At no time has appel-

lant told the lower court, by affidavit or otherwise, that
additional time for discovery was necessary.

In any event,

terms of the employment contract were set forth by respondent
in answers to written interrogatories and by affidavit of
respondent's Superintendent.

Appellant's claim that evidence

as yet undiscovered may create a dispute of fact, is unsubstantiated.
Appellant relies on the allegations of her Verified Complaint in an attempt to put at issue material facts.
lant's Brief at pp. 3-6.

Appel-

Appellant "cannot rely upon the mere

allegations or denials of her pleadings to avoid a summary
judgment but must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial."
936 (Utah 1979).

Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934,

Appellant has not set forth specific facts.

Rather, appellant suggests, inter alia, that respondent's negligence in using "substandard and unsafe" equipment on the bus
appellant drove caused appellant's injury and that this culpable behavior on the part of respondent warrants reversal of
the summary judgment.

Appellant also asserts that she was

ready, willing and able to perform her bus-driving duties in
May of 1984, see Appellant's Brief at p. 17, but no facts corroborate the assertion. To the contrary, appellant swore in her
-11-

Affidavit that it was August of 1984, not May, before she was
able to perform bus-driving services.
tiff, supra.

See Affidavit of plain-

Without a proper evidentiary foundation to sup-

port them, mere assertions are insufficient to preclude granting of summary judgment.
(Utah 1983).

Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d X170, 1172

These unsupported assertions can only be attempts

to obfuscate the clear legal basis for the lower court's summary judgment; they do not create any issue or dispute as to
any material fact.
POINT II
AS A MATTER OF LAW, APPELLANT"S EXTENDED
INABILITY TO PERFORM UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACT EXCUSED RESPONDENT'S NONPERFORMANCE.
It is a general rule of law that, in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, an employment contract for personal
services is terminated by the employee's sickness or disability
which renders the employee unable to perform his contract.

See

generally 53 Am. Jur. 2d Master and Servant S 38, at p. 114
(1970); 6 Corbin on Contracts, S 1334 (1962).

Where the sub-

ject matter of an employment agreement is the daily conveyance
of children to and from school over a long period of time, when
the safety of the children and the necessity for exercise by
the school district of great care in selecting a trustworthy,
competent and careful bus driver are taken into consideration,
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such an agreement is for the personal services of that particular bus driver.

Folquet v. Woodburn Public Schools, 146 Or.

339, 29 P.2d 554, 556-57 (1934).

Here, the employment agree-

ment between appellant Jolene Welch and respondent Grand County
School District was one for the personal services of appellant.

By application of law, appellant's inability to perform

those services terminated the employment agreement.
Although the Utah Supreme Court has never had this issue
squarely before it, numerous other state appellate courts have
applied this generally accepted rule of law to factual circumstances not dissimilar to the instant case.

The Supreme Court

of Wyoming, in Fisher v. Church of St. Mary, 497 P.2d 882 (Wyo.
1972), applied this rule to affirm a lower court's judgment for
the defendant employer where the plaintiff teacher contracted
to teach in defendant's school system for ten months commencing
August 31, 1970, but on November 12 suffered a cerebral hemorrhage and was unable to resume her teaching duties prior to
April 1, 1971. Defendant hired a full-time replacement commencing February 1, 1971.

The Wyoming court held that con-

tracts like the one before it, made "to perform personal acts,"
are made on the implied condition that the parties will be
alive and capable of performing the contract so that death or
disability, including sickness, "will operate as a discharge,
termination of the contract or excuse for non-performance."
Id. at 884 (footnote and citations omitted).
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The Wyoming court added that "after the breach has become
material or the prospective incapacity is such as to justify
termination the employer has an election to continue the contract or to terminate it."

Id.

Holdings similar to Fisher are

found in Smith v. Bd> of Ed. of the Ft. Madison Community Sch.
Dist., 293 N.W.2d 221 (Iowa 1980); Shawsheen Dairy, Inc. v.
Keefe, 29 N.E.2d 159 (Mass. 1940); Rodriguez v. Civil Service
Comm'n., 582 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Citizen's Home
Ins. Co. v. Glisson, 191 Va. 582, 61 S.E.2d 859 (1950); Oneal
v, Colton Consolidated Sch. Dist., 16 Wash. App. 488, 557 P.2d
11 (1976); See also Annotation 21 A.L.R.2d 1247.
The facts of the instant case argue more compellingly for
application of this rule of law than did the facts in Fisher.
There, the plaintiff was able to perform 2-1/2 months of her
ten-month contract, was then incapacitated for another 2-1/2
months, and at the time of replacement, with five months
remaining in the contract term, her prospective incapacity
would extend through two more months, leaving the prospect of 3
months1 work at the end of the contract term.

Thus, the plain-

tiff in Fisher would have been able to work 5-1/2 months of the
ten-month contract term.

Yet, the Wyoming court held that

plaintiff's inability to perform the contracted personal services for a substantial and material portion of the contract
term, justified termination and excused any nonperformance on
the part of the defendant school district.
-14-

Here, appellant worked for one month of her nine-month contract, became incapacitated, and was unable to return to work
thereafter.

The personal services for which respondent had

contracted could not be performed for eight of the nine months
of the contract term.

As in Fisher, the appellant's substan-

tial and material incapacity to perform, by application of law,
justified respondent's replacement of appellant and excused any
nonperformance of contractual obligations by respondent.
It is immaterial whether appellant was terminated in
January of 1984, as the facts show, or in May of 1984, as
appellant suggests in her Brief.

It is also immaterial whether

respondent's alleged breach of contract occurred, as appellant
indirectly argues, in August of 1984 when appellant's employment contract was not renewed.

Even assuming, arguendo, that,

as appellant alleges without substantiation, appellant's
employment contract would be automatically renewed annually and
that this automatic renewal was a term of her employment contract with respondent, appellant's inability to perform her
portion of the contract nevertheless excused any nonperformance
by respondent, including this alleged failure to automatically
renew.
No reasonable mind could disagree that incapacity preventing performance of eight months of a nine-month personal
service contract was substantial and material, such that any
nonperformance with respect to the contract would be excused.
-15-

As a matter of law, the termination of appellant's employment
was justified, respondent was excused from any nonperformance,
the contract was terminated without breach, and/or respondent's
duty to perform was discharged.
POINT III
"EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL" DOCTRINE HAS NO APPLICATION HERE.
This Court need not and should not consider appellant's
extended argument in her Brief dealing with the doctrine of
"employment-at-will" and its gradual erosion in jurisdictions
other than Utah.

Admissions by appellant that her employment

contract was for a definite term, that is, the nine-month
1983-84 school year, precludes application of the doctrine and
removes same from issue here.

Admittedly, the doctrine was

argued by respondent as grounds for its motion to dismiss, but
alternative legal basis was presented for respondent's Motion
for Summary Judgment and it was this alternative argument that
was adopted by the District Court in its grant of Summary Judgment.

Appellant's reliance on this argument as forming the

primary basis of respondent's Motion for, and the District
Court's Granting of, Summary Judgment is misplaced.
CONCLUSION
There is no issue as to any material fact in this case.
Appellant's inability to perform more than one month of a
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nine-month personal services employment contract excused
respondent's nonperformance.

Appellant's termination was

therefore justified and the District Court's Summary Judgment
should be, and it is hereby respectfully requested that it be,
affirmed.

^

DATED this o ^

day of January, 1986.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

AllanChristopher JS—duller
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant Grand County School
District
SCM1904P
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APPENDIX "A"

Served this

TKI. £> .,

C'*..

_De'enc'2;;t

TJ«ne„<L£

COFFMAN t COFFMAN
Penelope D. Coffman
59 East Center Street
Drawer J
Moab, Utah 81532-1371
Telephone: (801)259-5102

Deputy sttei jff

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CRAND COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

JOLENE L. WELCH,
CIVIL NO.
Plaintiff,
vs.

SUMMONS

CRAND COUNTY
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT:
You are hereby summoned and required to file an
Answer In writing to the attached Complaint with the Clerk of the
above-entitled Court, and to serve upon, or mail to, Penelope D.
Coffman, COFFMAN 6 COFFMAN, 59 East Center Street, Post Office
Drawer J , Moab, Utah 81532, Plaintiff's attorney, a copy of said
Answer within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon
you.

If you fail so to do, Judgment may be taken against
you for the relief demanded in said Complaint, which has been filed
with the Clerk of said Court and a copy of which is hereto annexed
and herewith served upon you.
DATED thi%^jffiday of December, A . D . 19B1.

COFFMAN 6 COFFMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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COFFMAN & COFFMAN
Penelope D. Coffman
59 East Center Street
Post Office Drawer J
Moab, Utah 84532-1371
Telephone: (801)259-5102
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOLENE L. WELCH,
CIVI L

Plaintiff,

NO. - 2 X ^ 3

vs.
VERIFIED
COMPLAINT

GRAND COUNTY
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant,

NOW

COMES

your

Plaintiff

and

respectfully

represents unto this Honorable Court as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

That at all times material, the Defendant Grand

County School District employed educators and support personnel

ft

for the purpose of operating a school system in Grand County,
Utah.

2.

That at all times material, each employee in the

District was responsible to the Board of Education through its
superintendent, Bill B. Meador.
3.
District

were

That at all times material, the educators in and

represented

by

the

G.E.A.

Union

and

its

representatives negotiated on an annua! basis, the terms of each
year's contract.
H.

That in August, 1WT1, Jolene L. Welch made

application to the Grand County School District for a position as
bus driver.

She was advised by

Elmer E.

Dravage,

Business

Manager of the Board of Education for the Grand County School
District, that bus drivers enjoyed the same negotiated benefits of
employment that the educators had gained by negotiations with the
exception of the number of days for sick leave.
included,

but

were

not

limited

to,

life

These benefits

insurance,

disability

insurance and vacation time.
5.

That at the time of her employment. Plaintiff

was advised that yearly contracts would be sent out each June
which would state the wage and reflect any changes.
understood

that

contracts

would be tendered

to

her

Plaintiff
annually

provided her work performance was satisfactory.
6.

Your Plaintiff thereafter commenced to work for

the Grand County School District, relying upon the representations
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of

Elmer

Dravage that

the union contract

in effect

with the

educators was the implied contract with the exception of sick leaves
that

covered

the

bus

drivers

and

that

as

long as her

job

performance was satisfactory she could rely upon the job security.
7.

That in accordance with the standards of the

Board of Education, your Plaintiffs job performance was evaluated
regularly and she never received a negative evaluation.
£

8.

That at all times Plaintiffs supervisors advised

her that her employment was for an indefinite term, the amount of

D

the wage to be negotiated every June, and that her job performance
was satisfactory.
9.
immediate

That,

supervisor,

pursuant

your

to

Plaintiff

the

direction

occasionally

children with special educational needs.

of

her

transported

That the vehicle your

Plaintiff was instructed to use on September 2, 1983 did not comply
with the minimum standards prescribed by the Utah Transportation
Commission,

which standards

are

promulgated

by

authority

of

Section 41-6-115 of the Utah Code Annotated, such standards being
set forth in the "Minimum Standards for Utah School Buses11 and
"Utah School Bus Driver Handbook" as Chapters 30-43.
That
( ^
xr

notwithstanding

the

lack

of

mechanical

apparatus to lift a child into a vehicle, in order to perform her job.

*

}->

the Plaintiff lifted a child into the vehicle on September 23, 1983.

That at the time of lifting a handicapped child wearing braces and
in a wheelchair, she bore weight on her right leg and turned to
adjust

the

position of the

child.

At

that

time,

your

Plaintiff

sustained a back injury.
10.
.

compensation

That

carrier

for

the
the

State

Insurance

Grand

County

Fund,
School

workman's
District,

compensated her for this injury.
11.

That on January 6, 1984, your Plaintiff called

Superintendent Bill B. Meador's office and was told that if she did
)
not return to work by the end of January she would be replaced.
That at the time of this conversation, your Plaintiff was under a
doctors care, had not been released for work, and was still being
compensated by the State Insurance Fund for a work-related injury.
12.

That on January 30, 1984, your Plaintiff again

talked with Superintendent Bill B. Meador and was told that he was
U

going to let her go.

When Plaintiff asked for a blue slip or some

other indication of termination, he told her that he was going to
hold her on the payroll until the end of May for insurance reasons.
13.

That on May 17, 1984, your Plaintiff called Bill

Meador and told him the doctor would release her to return to work
on or before August 2 1 , 1984.
y

Mr. Meador told your Plaintiff she

did not have a job, but refused to give her a blue slip or any
evidence of termination.

Subsequently, on the 29th day of June,
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1984, your Plaintiff received a letter stating her insurance was
cancelled.
14.
Rules approved
Education,

That the Handbook of Selected Policies and

and adopted by

provides

inter

the

alia,

in

Grand
4119.1,

termination procedures without discrimination.

County
for

Board of

the

orderly

Your Plaintiff had a

written contract of employment with the school district, and based
upon

the

representations

to

her

of

Elmer

Dravage

that

non-educators were protected by these provisions, she believes that
she is entitled to the protection of these provisions, to-wit:

(1)

receiving a notice prior to the end of the contract, in wrfting of
intent

not to employ;

(2)

right of a fair

hearing

concerning

employment status or a right to an informal conference.
15.

That your Plaintiff believes that the date upon

which her insurance was cancelled by the school district is the
effective date of termination although she has made demand for a
blue slip and has not received a blue slip or any other indication of
termination.
16.

That the Defendant has terminated the Plaintiff

contrary to the policies and procedures of the Defendant and in
violation of the implied contract the Defendant had with the support
employees.
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17.

That the Defendant has wrongfully discharged

your Plaintiff, and such a discharge is against public policy in that
her

absenteeism

resulted

from

a

job-related

injury

for

which

workman's compensation benefits were paid throughout her period of
absenteeism.
18.

That

Plaintiff,

as

a

direct

result

of

this

wrongful termination, has sustained a loss of income, both present
and

future,

employment,

incurred
suffered

expenses
a

loss

associated
of

pension

with

a

benefits

search
and

for
other

employment benefits, and has been damaged in other regards.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

19.

That the Plaintiff incorporates by

reference,

the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 18 of her

First

Cause of Action as if fully set forth herein.
20.

That actions of the Defendant in terminating

the Plaintiffs employment as described above were outrageous and
extreme, going beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be
regarded

as

atrocious

and

utterly

intolerable

in

a

civilized

community.
20.

That

the

Defendant's

actions

were

done

intentionally and recklessly without regard for the rights of the
Plaintiff.
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21.

That as a direct

result of the

Defendant's

outrageous conduct in terminating the Plaintiffs employment,

the

Plaintiff sustained severe emotional distress.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

22.

That

the

Plaintiff

incorporates by

reference

the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 18 of the First
Cause of

Action and paragraphs

19-21 of the

Second

Cause of

Action, as if fully set forth herein.
23.
terminating

the

That

the

Plaintiffs

actions

of

employment

the
were

Defendant
attended

in
by

circumstances of f r a u d , malice and a wanton or reckless disregard
for the rights and feelings of the Plaintiff,

thereby entitling the

Plaintiff to reasonable exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for Judgment against
the

Defendant

for

compensatory

and

exemplary

damages

as

determined by the trier of fact, for costs, interest from the date of
termination,

expert

witness

fees, deposition expenses, and such

other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.
DATED this

VLVVLWe> • U^vAfl^
Penelope D. Cortman
Coffman 6 Coffman, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

ff

day o f A u g u s t , A . D . 1984.

Jo]?ne L. Welch
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STATE OF UTAH
County of Grand

)

) ss.
)

JOLENE L. WELCH the signer of the foregoing
instrument, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
That she has read the above and foregoing
instrument and knows the contents thereof; that the same is true to
the best of her knowledge except as to matters therein slated on
information and as to such matters, she believes it to be true.

W n e L. Weldh " ^ ~
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
r A . D . 1981.

.day of

^xf>l£fa//to/

My commission expires:

iry
Residing at Moab, Utah

-8-

64532

APPENDIX "B"

ALLAN L. LARSON
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
ROBERT H. RUGGERI
P. O. Box 310
Moab, Utah 84532
Telephone: (801) 259-5611
Attorneys for Defendant Grand
County School District

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOLENE L. WELCH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT,

DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES
Civil No. 5233

Defendant.

The defendant Grand County School District answers plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories as follows:
1.

State whether or not Elmer E. Dravage, in his capacity

as Business Manager of the Board of Education for the Grand
County School District or in any other position as an agent for

the Grand County School District, had a conversation with
Jolene Welch at the time she was hired as a bus driver wherein
he outlined the benefits of the job.
Objection:

Defendant objects to this interrogatory on the

grounds that it is vague and ambiguous.

Use of the term "bene-

fits of the job," without clarification, is misleading and subject to various interpretations.
Answer:

Without waiving the objection stated above, upon

information and belief, defendant asserts that Mr. Elmer E.
Dravage met briefly with plaintiff Jolene L. Welch at or about
the time she was first employed as a bus driver by the Grand
County School District.
2.

If the answer to Interrogatory No. 1 is in the affir-

mative, please relate the substance of the conversation.
Objection:

The objection stated to Interrogatory No. 1,

next above, is incorporated herein by reference.
Answer:

Without waiving the aforementioned objection, upon

information and belief, defendant states that at the brief
meeting between Mr. Dravage and Ms. Welch, which occurred at or
near the time when Ms. Welch was first hired by defendant, the
conversation was limited to introductions and pleasantries, and
the formalities of completing and signing applications or forms
for State Retirement, Group Hospital Insurance, and tax withholding (W-4).
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3.

Please state whether or not bus drivers in 1981

enjoyed the same negotiated benefits of employment that the
educators had gained by negotiation through the G.E-A. Union,
with the exception of the number of days for sick leave.
Answer:
4.

No.

If they did not enjoy the same benefits, please state

the benefits the bus drivers had, and how they were different
from those enjoyed by the educators.
Answer:

In 1981, Grand County School District bus drivers

were not represented by the G.E.A. or any other union.

Bus

drivers were classified personnel and as such negotiated
individually with the School District for the purpose of entering into employment contracts.

The benefits enjoyed by the

Grand County School District bus drivers included:
(a) Nine month employment period (commonly referred
to as a school year);
(b) Five days of sick leave per school year;
(c)

Sick leave accumulation up to fifteen days, but

upon termination such accumulated sick leave would not be converted to money payment;
(d) One day personal leave per school year;
(e) No vacation time;
(f) Two days death and funeral leave per school year;
(g) Participation in group hospital insurance plan.

-3-

(h) Participation in disability insurance plan.
Educators' benefits included, but were not necessarily
limited to:
(a) Public service leave with partial pay;
(b) Extra pay for certain extra-curricular activities;
(c)

Sabbatical leave pay;

(d) 6.E.A. representation at contract negotiations
with the school district;
(e) Participation in the state retirement pension
program;
(f) Long-term disability insurance benefits;
(g)

Group medical and hospital insurance benefits;

(h)

Class size and total student load constraints;

(i) Protection through the District's "Orderly Termination Procedure";
(j) Protection through the District's "Grievance Procedure";
5.

Please provide a copy of the policies you relied upon

in the Second Defense which you allege provide for orderly termination procedures as to certain classifications of employees.
Answer:

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a copy of the

Grand County School District's "Orderly Termination Procedure."
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6.

If you will do so without a Motion to Produce, please

provide a copy of the termination notice you allegedly furnished the plaintiff.
Objection:

Defendant objects to this interrogatory on the

grounds that it misstates the record, which is void of any
allegation by defendant that defendant furnished the plaintiff
with a termination notice.
7.

Please state how often performance evaluations were

conducted on the plaintiff and provide copies of all performance evaluations of the plaintiff's work.
Answer:

Defendant Grand County School District did not use

a regular performance evaluation form during the time plaintiff
was employed with the School District.

Plaintiff's perfor-

mance, however, was reviewed on an ongoing basis by Mr. Anthony
Pene, Supervisor of Transportation for Grand County School
District.

With respect to bus driver performance, Mr. Pene

reported directly to Superintendent Bill D. Meador and the
Grand County School Board.

Defendant is not in possession of

any written evaluation of plaintiffs employment performance.
8.

Please state the basis of your denial that plaintiff

would continue to have her job as long as her work performance
was satisfactory.
Answer:

All Grand County School District bus drivers are

hired for a nine month period, generally referred to as a
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school year.

At the end of the school year, and prior to the

beginning of the next school year, a bus driver may be rehired
for the next nine month, school year period.
9.

Please describe the procedure wherein yearly contracts

are sent out each June to educators and bus drivers, and what
procedures are used to determined proposed variations in contracts.
Objection:

Defendant objects to this interrogatory on the

grounds that it is based on an assumption of inaccurate and
incorrect facts, and is therefore ambiguous.
Answer:

Without waiving the aforementioned objection,

defendant states that with respect to bus drivers hired by the
School District, the Board of Education determines on an annual
basis the number of bus drivers needed for that particular
school year.

Inquiries are made of prospective bus drivers

already in the employ of the District whether these drivers
would be available for employment during the next school year.
If school bus driver positions are available for the next
school year, and a prospective bus driver answers the inquiry
in the affirmative, a letter is sent to the prospective bus
driver stating the employment terms for the next school year.
The bus driver is requested to sign the letter if the terms of
employment are agreeable.

Once a signed letter is received by
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the School District, that particular bus driver position is
deemed filled for the coming school year.
10.

Please state the basis for your denial of paragraph 9

of plaintiff's Bill of Complaint by outlining all the steps
that you had taken to comply with Section 41-6-115, Utah Code
Annotated, in September, 1983, including but not limited to
listing the make and model of all equipment owned pursuant to
the dictates of that statute.
Objection:

Defendants object to this interrogatory on the

grounds that it is vague and ambiguous, burdensome and oppressive and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
11.

Please state the substance of the conversation between

Superintendent Meador and the plaintiff on January 6, 1984.
Answer:

Superintendent Meador has no present recollection

of any conversation he had with the plaintiff on January 6,
1984.

Investigation and discovery in this matter is continuing

and additional facts may be discovered at a later date.
12.

Please state the substance of the conversation between

Superintendent Meador and the plaintiff on January 30, 1984.
Answer:

Superintendent Meador has no recollection of any

conversation between him and the plaintiff on January 30,
1984.

Superintendent Meador does recall, however, that on

January 31, 1984, plaintiff came to Superintendent Meador1s
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office and informed him that she could not return to work for
another six week period and did not know if her doctor would
release her for work at that time.

Superintendent Meador and

plaintiff discussed plaintiff's medical condition, and at that
time Superintendent Meador informed the plaintiff that the
School District would hire a new bus driver on a full-time
basis, but that the School District would maintain plaintiffs
health insurance coverage through June 30, 1984.
Investigation and discovery in this matter is continuing
and additional facts may be discovered at a later date.
13.

Please state the substance of the conversation between

Superintendent Meador and the plaintiff on May 17, 1985.
Answer:

Superintendent Meador has no present recollection

of any conversation between him and the plaintiff on May 17,
1984.

Superintendent Meador, however, does recall that at some

time in May, 1984, plaintiff once again came to his office to
discuss her employment situation.

At that time, Superintendent

Meador informed plaintiff that the plaintiff had been replaced,
but that plaintiff could reapply for a bus driving position if
and when she became physically capable of performing the duties
required of a regular, full-time bus driver.
Investigation and discovery in this matter is continuing
and additional facts may be discovered at a later date.
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14.

Please state the facts you intend to rely upon in your

affirmative defense wherein you allege plaintiff failed to
mitigate her damages.
Answer:

Even though plaintiff alleges that she was

entitled to the provisions of the Grand County School District
"Orderly Termination Procedures/1 plaintiff has never asserted
any right to, nor has she actually attempted to, begin such
procedure.

Plaintiff has never furnished Grand County School

District with any evidence that she was physically capable of
resuming her duties as a regular, full-time bus driver.

Even

though plaintiff was advised by Superintendent Meador that
plaintiff could make application for employment with the School
District for the 1984-85 school year, plaintiff did not do so.
Investigation and discovery in this matter is continuing
and additional supporting facts may be discovered at a later
date.
15.

Please describe the acts or omissions of the defen-

dant, that you allege in your fourth defense were undertaken in
good faith, without malice, with probable cause, and describe
how they were justified.
Answer:

Defendant affirmatively asserts that each and

every action complained of by plaintiff in plaintiff's
Complaint was undertaken in good faith, without malice, with
probable cause, and therefore was justified.
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16.

State whether or not you intend to assert that plain-

tiff's inability to work was due to an unwillingness to perform
the tasks attendant to her employment.
Objection:

Defendant objects to this interrogatory on the

grounds that it requests information which is the work product
of defendant's attorneys and/or information which is protected
by the attorney-client privilege, and is therefore not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
17.

Please provide a copy of the policies and procedures

covering bus drivers in the Grand County School District.
Answer:

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a copy of the

policies and procedures of the Grand County School District
dealing with classified personnel, which includes policies and
procedures for bus drivers in the Grand County School District.
DATED this

/ ^ d a y of April, 1985.
ANSWERS BY:

Bill B. Meador, Superintendent
Grand County School District

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss •
COUNTY OF GRAND )
Bill B. Meador, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he is the Superintendent of Grand County School District,
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that he has been authorized to make in its behalf the foregoing
Answers to Interrogatories; that he makes said Answers on
information and belief, and that he is informed and believes
that said Answers are true and correct.

Bill B. Meador

&L^^L^S^L^

Subscribed and sworn to before me this /Q7*- day of April,
1985.

Notary Public
Residing at:

,V
rlo^h^

%A

,
Qjjk

My Commission Expires:

OBJECTIONS BY:
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

AND BY:
-UuK.
Robert H. Ruggeri
Attorneys for Deferidfattt

SCM1508P
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-12Rcceived a copy of the Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's First
Set of Interrogatories in Civil No. 5233 in the Seventh Judicial
District Court of Grand County, State of Utahf this 10th day of
April, A. D., 1985.
COFFMAN & COFFMAN

At^opneys tojf P l a i n t i f f ,
L. wMch

EXHIBIT "A"

Personnel
Orderly Termination Procedure
Decisions to not re-employ certificated personnel for a new
school tern will be made by the Board of Education upon recommendation of the Superintendent.
The Grand County Board of Education by resolution establishes the
following procedures for the orderly termination of educators
without discrimination.
As used 1n this regulation:
1. "Contract term" or "term of employment" means the period of
time an educator 1s engaqed by the school district pursuant to
a contract of employment whether oral or written.
2. "Dismissal" or "termination" means:
A. Any termination of the status of employment of an educator.
B. Failure to renew the employment contract of an educator
who pursuant to the employment practices of the school
district has a reasonable expectation of continued employment 1n successive years. (4117.A)
C. Reduction 1n salary of an educator not generally applied to
all educators of the same category In the employ of the
school district durlnq such educator's contract term.
D. Change of assignment of an educator with an accompanying
reduction In pay, unless such assignment change and
salary reduction is agreed to In wiitlnn.
3. "Educator" or "teacher" means all teaching and professional
personnel of the school district who hold positions requiring
certification and valid certificates Issued to them by the State
Board of Education.
Every educator is entitled to the right of a fair hearing concerning
his/her employment status or after recelvlnq notice of Intent not to
re-employ. Request for such hearing must be made In writing to
the Superintendent within fifteen days of date of said notice. The
Board of Education or its hearinn examiners will within fifteen days
after due notice and on demand of the educator meet to conduct a
hearing.
If the district Intends not to renew contract of employment of an
Individual entitled to employment In succeedlnq years according to
district personnel program, notice of such Intention shall be given
the Individual. Said notice shall be Issued at least two months

Personnel
Orderly Termination Procedure (continued)
before the end of the contract term of the Individual* e.g., the school
year. The notice In wrltlnn shall be served by personal delivery
or by certified mall addressed to the Individual's last known
address. The notice shall be dated and contain a clear and concise
statement that the individual's contract will not be renewed for an
ensuing tern and the reasons for the termination.
In the absence of timely notice, an employee Is deemed to be
re-employed for the succeedInn contract term with a salary based
upon the salary schedule applicable to the class of employee into
which the Individual falls. This provision shall not be construed
to preclude the dismissal of an employee during his contract term
for cause.
At least one month prior to 1ssu1nq notice of Intent not to renew
the contract of the Individual, he shall be Informed 1n writing
of the fact that continued employment Is 1n question and the reasons
therefore and given an opportunity to correct the defects which
precipitated possible nonrenewal. The Individual may be granted
assistance In his efforts to make correction of the deficiencies
which may Include Informal conferences and the services of
applicable school personnel within the district.
In cases where the district Intends to terminate an Individual's
contract during his contract term, the district shall give written
notice of such Intent to said Individual. Said notice shall be
served by personal delivery or by certified mall addressed to the
Individual's last known address. Said notice shall be given at least
fifteen days prior to the proposed date of termination. It shall
state the date of termination and the detailed reasons for such
termination.
notices of Intention not to renew the contract of employment of
an Individual or of Intention to terminate his contract during
its term shall advise the Individual that he may request an
Informal conference before the Hoard or such personnel as the district
may designate. Request for such hearing shall be made In writing
to the Superintendent not later than fifteen days after the
date of said notice has been Issued to the individual.
This orderly dismissal procedure pursuant to which a contract is
terminated during Its term herebv Includes the provision that the
active service of the Individual may be suspended pending a
heartnq when 1t appears that the continued employment of the
Individual may be harmful to students or to the district. Individuals
Involved In this type of action shall receive a written notice of

4119.1

Personnel
Orderly ^termination Procedure (continued)
suspension or final termination including findings of fact made by
the Board when such suspension or termination is for cause.
At all hearings, after due notice, and on demand of the educator,
he/she may be represented by counsel, produce witnesses, hear the
testimony against hixt^her, cross examine witnesses and examine
documentary evidence.
The Board of Education of this district is authorized and empowered
to appoint hearing examiners if it appears to be in the best interest
of the district or individual concerned and may delegate to such
hearing examiners or may enter into contracts whereby said hearing
examiners may make decisions relating to the employment of the educator
which shall be binding upcn both the educator and the Board. Nothing
herein shall be construed to limit the right of either the Board or
the eriunafor to appeal to an appropriate court of law.
Nothing in this procedure shall be construed to preclude staff reduction when necessary to decrease the niiriber of teachers because of
decreased student enrollment in the district, because of the discontinuance of a particular service, because of the shortage of anticipated revenue after the budget has been adopted, or because of school
consolidations*
If staff reduction is necessary because of one or more of the above
described conditions, the following procedure will apply:
EUSMEHTBIPf
1* Teachers hired during the last contract year will be released
first. If more teachers were hired the previous year than the
number needed in the required reduction, the principal's evaluation of teaching effectiveness and reoonmendations will be
used to determine the individuals retained.
2. If a particular program is discontinued, teacher/teachers will
be allowod to transfer to another assignment, providing he/she
is not a first-year teacher and holds proper certification for
the position to which he/she will be assigned.
SECONDARE

(6-12)

1. If a particular program or service is discontinued, the teacher/
teachers of that program may transfer to other programs, provided
an opening is available and he/she holds proper certification
for the program for which he/she will tove responsibility.
2. If more than one staff member requests a transfer of teaching
assignment, with proper certification, the initial contract
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Personnel
Orderly Termination Procedure (continued)
year and tine in service will be used as the determining factor
in making the assignment. If all teachers requiring transfer
were hired during the same contract year, the principal's zeccmnendations and teacher evaluations will be used to determine
the individuals retained.
3. In the event conditions determine that every program, subject,
or service must be reduced, the contract year will be the determining factor regarding the staff to be retained. Principals"
evaluations and recommendations will be used if all staff senrtng
in the positions to be eliminated were employed during the sans
contract year.
Teachers whose services have been satisfactory shall be given a written
recommendation, upon request, explaining the conditions under which
the release took place.
Recall Procedure
Iteoommendations
In the event that additional students enroll in Grand County School
District, or additional revenues beocne available, or other teaching
vacancies occur, the Board shall recall, if possible, teachers who
have been laid off before it employs or assigns any additional personnel to fill teaching assignments. Teachers with the greatest
seniority, who have the proper certification far the position, shall
be recalled to available positions first.

Legal Beference
Orderly School Termination
Procedures
House Bill 108
1973

pule
Approved:
Revised:

8/14/74
3/16/82

GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
Moab, Utah

4200
EXHIBIT "B"

Personnel
Classified Personnel
The board shall, upon recommendation of the superintendent,
classify all employees not requiring certification according
to the provisions of the job assignment 1n effect at the time
of employment.

Policy
adopted: 1/19/70

GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
Moab, Utah

Personnel
Employment £ Conditions of Work
The superintendent of schools shall establish work schedules,
provision for absences and other conditions of work In keeping with the board's policies. Working conditions shall be
designed to promote excellent physical and mental health of
•11 employees.
General employment regarding vacations, leaves of absence,
resignation, re-employment, duties, hours and other natters
related to the nature of the position not specifically noted
herein are determined by the board of education upon recommendation of the administrator of the department and the
superintendent. These will not necessarily be Identical for
til departments.

Policy
adopted:

1/19/70

GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
Moab, Utah

Policy
Personnel
Recruitment and Selection
The Grand County Board of Education is ccmnitted to providing equal employment
opportunity regardless of race, creed, color, national origin, religion, age,
•ex, handicap, or any other condition as required by various state and federal
laws. Responsibility for compliance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 regarding equal employment
opportunity rests with the superintendent of schools.
General Qualifications
Skills - The person employed must have sufficient language, mechanical, computational, and clerical skill to perform his basic tasks without close supervision.
Maturity - The person employed must have reasonable emotional' balance and selfcontrol.
Facility in Dealing with Others - The person employed must enjoy working with other
people and must have a natural ease in dealing with students, staff, and members
of the public with whom he will be in contact.
Understanding of Department Function - The person employed must have or be able
to develop very readily a clear understanding of the function of his department
in operating the school system
Characteristics of Positions
Critical - Types of positions in which the cost of errors is high. The cost may
be in terms of monetary loss, damaged public relations, or disturbed personality
(as with students) •
Less Critical - Types of positions in which the cost of errors is low, however
annoying those errors may be.
Selection of Employees
Critical Positions - Persons selerted must be outstanding in each one of the four
general qualifications listpid above. They may be required to have had experience
in the type of work they are to do or to be at a certain age level. Persons selected for critical clerical positions may be required to have had college training.
Less Critical Positions - Persons selected must possess each one of the four general
<jttlifinatinns listed~above. They shall not be required to have had college training, past experience, or age beyond that needed for high school graduation.
Policy
Adopted: 1/19/70
Revised: 7/8/81

Grand County School District
Moab, Utah

4214

Rule

Personnel
Physical Examination
All bus drivers are required to have a physical examination upon enplayment
and annually thereafter by a oonpetent medical doctor and file a report of
the same with the superintendent. The Board shall assime the fee up to arri
including $20.00 for such examination.
All lunch roan personnel are required to have a physical examination upon
employment. The Board shall assume the fee up to and including $20.00
for such examination.
The district also reserves the right to require a health examination before
the employee returns to work following illness, other leave, or at any
time when the need for such examination may be indicated.

Rile
Approved: 8/30/71
Revised: B/13/15
Revised: 7/21/82

GRAND COCNIY SCHOOL DISTOICT
MOAB, UTAH

Personnel
Assignment and Transfer
Transfer to another position or class shall be based upon a
consideration of
1.

a change In the entire nature of the job.

2.

increased or reduced, responsibilities.

3. quality of work performed.
4. Length of service.

Policy
adopted:

1/19/70

GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
Noab, Utah

Personnel
Responsibilities and Duties
The duties and responsibilities of all classified enployees
shall be defined 1n accordance with job descriptions adopted
by the board and published In a separate nanuai.

Policy
adopted:

1/19/70

GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
Moab, Utah

Personnel
Teacher Aides
Teacher aides will be utilized to help remedy the shortage
of qualified teachers. They can be used to help teachers
overcome the disadvantages of large classes, but they may
also be used as resource personnel to enrich the school
program* or to help teachers In regular classrooms.
Teacher aides may be used to help pupils who need Individual
Instruction, working directly under the supervision of the
teacher; they may also relieve the teacher of some of the
duties that prevent his giving Individual Instruction to
pupils in need of It.
Certain criteria should be established with regard to the*
selection of teacher aides. The administration shall
1. carefully select quality Individuals as aides.
2.

Inauguarate a strong program of professional supervision.

3.

place the aide 1n a compatible situation with a good
cooperative teacher.

4.

provide an adequate In-service training program.

5.

Inform the public and staff regarding the program so that
It will be properly understood and received.

Policy
adopted: 1/19/70

GRANO COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
Moab, Utah

4223.4
Personnel
Grievances
The Grand County Board of Education believes that good personnel nanagement
requires the means by which an employee may present a complaint without
prejudice of any kind to anyone involved 1n a grievance.
Definition
A grievance shall mean a complaint by an employee of the Grand County
School District that there may have been a violation, misinterpretation
or Inequitable application or any provision concerning district policies
or terms and conditions of employment.
Formal Hearing Officer
The Board of Education by this policy designates the Superintendent of
the Grand County School District as the hearing officer dealing with all
formal grievance procedures as outlined In rule 4223.5

Policy
Approved: 10/16/78
Revised:
8/15/79

Grand County School District
Moab, Utah

4223.5
Rules
Personnel
Grievances
Purpose
The prupose of the grievance procedure is to resolve employee or
student dissatisfaction Informally, promptly and equitably at the lowest
supervisory level with the efforts of employee, student and administrator
being directed toward the objective.
Procedure
Step 1 - Informal
Should an educator or student believe there Is a basis for a grievance,
he/she should discuss the grievance with his/her building principal or
the Grand Education PR and R Association Representative (employees) with
the objective of resolving the matter. Proceedings should be kept as
Informal and confidential as may be appropriate for its determination.
This, however, does not limit the right of any employee or student who
has a grievance to discuss the matter with the superintendent.
Step 2 - Formal
In the event the response at the informal and first level of supervision
proves unsatisfactory, the complaint and decision will be reduced to
writing and copies forwarded to the Superintendent within ten (10) days
following the decision.
Step 3
Within fifteen (15) days after receiving a written complaint or at a
time mutually agreed upon, the Superintendent will hold a hearing with
the aggrieved employee or student. If the aggrieved party is a student
his/her parents will be invited to the hearing. If the aggrieved is an
employee a member of the Grand Education Association PR and R committee
will be invited to attend the hearing.
Step 4
Within fifteen (15) days of the hearing the Superintendent will make
his decision known to the aggrieved party. The decision will be in
writing and mailed to the aggrieved party at their last known address.
If the aggrieved employee or student is not satisfied with the decision,
an appeal may be made in writing within fifteen (15) days requesting a formal
hearing by the Board of Education.
Step 5
Within fifteen (15) days after receiving a written request for a hearing,
the Board of Education will meet to conduct such hearing. The aggrieved
party may be represented by legal counsel, or others chosen to act on his/her
behalf.

4223.5 (continued)
Rules
Step 6
Within fifteen (15) days after the hearing, the Board of Education
will notify the complaintant. In writing, of the decision.
Step 6 will be the final action taken by the district and the Board
of Education.
Nothing herein stated in the procedure shall be construed to limit
the Board of Education of the complaintant to appeal to an appropriate
court of law.
No educator, employee or student will suffer reprisals, reduction in
status or reduction of grades or rights of any nature as a result of
having presented a grievance or having been a party in interest in the
grievance procedure.

Rules
approved

10/16/78

Grand County School District
Moab, Utah 84532

Personnel
Compensation and Related Benefits
The board shall fix and order paid the compensation of classified employees and other employees not requiring certification
qualifications and shall pay such compensation at least monthly
on or before the twenty-seventh day of the month.

Policy
adopted: 1/19/70

GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
Moab, Utah

Personnel
Salary 6u1des
A salary schedule for all the work classifications 1n which
classified personnel are employed shall be adopted annually
by the governing board.
Classified employees shall be placed on the salary schedule
according to job requirements and experience. Such classification 1s made at the time of appointment.
Normally, all new employees shall be hired at the first step
on the schedule for the classification Involved. Credit for
experience may be allowed and the employee hired at the step
authorized by the superintendent and screening committee.
The district may Increase the salaries of Its classified
employees during a school year by the adoption of a resolution
to that effect before the beginning of the school year.
Annual one-step pay Increases will be granted upon completion
75* of one year of service by July 1.

Policy
adopted:

1/19/70

GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
Moab, Utah

4142 (b)
4232

Personnel
Salary Checks and Deductions (continued)
an annuity contract tdthln the meaning of Section 403 (b)» as amended
of the Internal Revenue Code for a premium In an amount equal to
the reduction in salary. Application for such contracts can be
made on the following dates only: September 15, December 15, March 15,
and June 15 of each year.

Policy
Adopted: 1/19/70
Revised: 8/13/75

6RAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
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4235

Personnel
Hospitalization
Medical inaurance coverage shall be provided for all full time
employees, classified and certificated.
The employee who uorke leee than full time may elect to participate on the insurance program but must pay the premiums*
Teaching pereonnel completing their contract for a school year
but not returning for the forthcoming yeer uill have their group
health inaurance coverage dropped on June 30th*
Certificated and other personnel who terminate during the year
uill have their group health insurance dropped at the and of the
month in yhich they terminate.
Teachers new to the dietrlct uill be covered for group health
ineurence purposes on the first of the month following the
aigning of their contract.

Policy
adopted: B/30/71

GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
Moab, Utah

4241.
4241.
Personnel
Absences and leaves
Sick leave cannot be considered as entitlement or as annual leave. Further,
accumulated sick leave Is not to be considered in final settlement of employees
whose services are terminated for any reason other than death. Any unused
portion of accumulated sick leave of any employee who dies while 1n the
employment of the Grand County School District will accrue to the benefit of
the surviving spouse or the estate of said employee, at the rate of pay per
day on the date of death.
The Board of Education or superintendent nay request evidence of need for
sick leave in any Instance. In the event an employee misuses or purports
to misuse the benefits under this policy, he or she will forfeit benefits
which are due or may accrue to him or her under the terms of this agreement.
Leave shall be granted to classified personnel, as follows:
1. Maintenance, Custodial and District Office Personnel
Length of Employment - 12 Months
a. Ten (10) days sick leave per year.
b. Sick leave can be accumulated up to 30 days, however, accumulated
sick leave will not be paid on termination of employment.
c. Two (2) days personal leave per year which must be approved by
Immediate supervisor.

2.

School Secretaries
Length of employment - 10 Months
a. Seven (7) days sick leave per year.
b. Sick leave can be accumulated up to 21 days, however, accumulated
sick leave will not be paid on termination of employment.
c. Two (2) days personal leave per year which must be approved by Immediate
supervisor or principal.

3. School Lunch Personnel. Bus Drivers, Teacher Aides and Attendance Aides
Length of employment - 9 months
a. Five (5) days sick leave per year.
b. Sick leave can be accumulated up to 15 days, however, accumulated
sick leave will not be paid on termination of employment.
c. One (1) day personal leave per year which must be approved by
Immediate supervisor or principal.
4. Less than full-time employees
a. No sick leave
b. No personal leave

Personnel
Vacations/Holidays
All personnel who terminate may have their vacation time prorated as
approved by the superintendent. Paid vacation days are non-accumulative
and must be taken in the year they dre earned; unless at the discretion
of the superintendent, he deans it necessary that all or part of the
vacation due should be paid.
Paid vacation days will be granted classified and certified personnel as
follows:
1. Maintenance, Custodial, Transportation, and District Office Personnel
Length of employment - 12 months. Ten (10) working days after
completion of one full year of employment. Fifteen (15) working
days after ten (10) years of employment.
2. School Secretaries
Length of employment - 10 months. No vacation time.
3. School Lunch Personnel and Bus Drivers
Length of employment - 9 months. No Vacation time.
4. Teacher Aides
Length of employment - 9 months. No vacation time.
The working schedule for full time employed personnel at the District Office
shall recognize the following holidays and such other days as may be granted
by the Board:
Independence Day
Pioneer Day
Labor Day
Veterans Day (Deer Hunt)
Thanksgiving (Thursday & Friday)
Christmas Day

New Year's Day
Easter - Good Friday and Monday
Memorial Day

When any of the days listed above fall on Sunday, the following Monday shall
be the day of observance; and when any fall on Saturday, the preceding
Friday shall be the day of observance.

Policy
Adopted: 1/19/70
Revised: 7/1/74
0/16/78

Grand County School District
Moab, UT

4241.1 (i
4241.11
Personnel

Absences and Leaves (continued)
5. All full-time classified employees
a. Two days death and funeral leave under the guidelines established

for certified employees.
6. Jury Duty - Full time employees
a. The district will pay each employee selected for jury duty the
difference between the amount paid for jury duty and their regular
salary or wages.

Policy Adopted: 1/19/70
Revised:
8/13/75
Revised:
9/21/77
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APPENDIX "C"

ALLAN L. LARSON
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
ROBERT H. RUGGERI
P. O. Box 310
Moab, Utah 84532
Telephone: (801) 529-5611
Attorneys for Defendant Grand
County School District

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOLENE L. WELCH,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Civil No. 5233
Defendant.

Defendant, by and through its counsel of record, moves this
Court to dismiss plaintiff's Verified Complaint, or, in the
alternative, to grant Summary Judgment in its favor.

Defen-

dant's Motion is based upon the grounds that the allegations
contained in plaintiff's Verified Complaint, even if assumed to

be true, do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted;
and, in the alternative, that, as a matter of law, defendant
was discharged from performance and the contract upon which
plaintiff sues was terminated by law upon plaintiffs inability
to perform thereunder.

The legal grounds upon which this

Motion is based are more fully set forth in the accompanying
Memorandum of Points and Authorities.
DATED this

day of May, 1985.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

(,A^/(}^h^

Allan L. /Larson

AND BY

Robert H. Ruggeri
Attorneys for Defendant
SCM1542P
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ALLAN L. LARSON
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
ROBERT H. RUGGERI
P. O. Box 310
Moab, Utah 84532
Telephone: (801) 259-5611
Attorneys for Defendant
Grand County School District

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOLENE L. WELCH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS, OR, IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 5233

Defendant.

Defendant Grand County School District submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its
Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary
Judgment.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

In August of 1980, Jolene Welch made application to

and was hired by Grand County School District as a bus driver.
See Affidavit of Bill Meador, attached hereto as Exhibit MA.M
2.

In her Verified Complaint, plaintiff claims that, after

plaintiff was employed by defendant, (a) employment contracts
would be tendered to her thereafter on an annual basis by
defendant Grand County School District "provided her work performance was satisfactory" (Verified Complaint at 11 5), (b) "as
long as her job performance was satisfactory" plaintiff had
"job security" with defendant (id. at 1f 6), and (c) "her
employment was for an indefinite term" (j^d. at 1f 8).
3.

On September 23, 1983 plaintiff was injured in a

work-related accident.

As a result of the injury, plaintiff

was not able to continue working, entered into the care of a
physician, and received compensation from the State Insurance
Fund for the work-related injury.
4.

At the time plaintiff was injured, she was working

under an employment agreement with defendant Grand County
School District.

This agreement was for the 1983-84 school

year, covering a nine-month employment period.

After the

injury in September of 1983, plaintiff, under doctor's orders,
did not return to work.

See Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's

First Set of Interrogatories; Affidavit of Bill Meador, supra.
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5.

On January 31, 1984, plaintiff was informed by defen-

dant's Superintendent, Bill Meador, that because of plaintiff's
inability to return to work defendant would hire a new fulltime bus driver to fill plaintiff's position, but would nevertheless continue plaintiff's health insurance under the employment agreement through June 30, 1984. From the time of plaintiff's injury in September until a full-time driver was hired
at the end of January, defendant had employed a bus driver on a
part-time, temporary basis in order to cover plaintiff's bus
route.

See Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of

Interrogatories; Affidavit of Bill Meador, supra.
6.

At all times pertinent here, Grand County School

District bus drivers were "classified personnel" of the
District and were not represented by the Grand Education Association in contract negotiations with defendant School
District.

See Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of

Interrogatories.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED COMPLAINT ALLEGES A
"TERMINABLE AT WILL" EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
WITH DEFENDANT AND THUS THE AGREEMENT IS
TERMINABLE BY EITHER PARTY AT ANY TIME FOR
ANY REASON.
Plaintiff alleges in her Verified Complaint that plaintiff's employment with defendant Grand County School District
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"was for an indefinite term."
K 8.

Plaintiff's Verified Complaint

This is corroborated by allegations from Paragraphs 5 and

6 of the Verified Complaint, which state that, according to
plaintiff, she enjoyed "job security", or perennial employment
contract offers, as long as her work performance was satisfactory.

These allegations unequivocally claim that plaintiff's

employment with defendant had no definite time period or duration, but that the term of employment was for an indefinite
period of time.
Utah law with respect to employment contracts of indeterminate length is stated succinctly in Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603
P. 2d 790 (Utah 1979).

There the Utah Supreme Court wrote that

where the employment agreement does not expressly or impliedly
stipulate the duration of the employment period, "the contract
is no more than an indefinite hiring which is terminable at the
will of either party."

JId. at 792. The Bihlmaier court fur-

ther declared that:
When an individual is hired for an indefinite
time, he has no right of action against his employer
for breach of the employment contract upon being discharged . . . .
[S]ince it was shown [here that] the
term of employment was indefinite and terminable at
the will of either party, . . . the plaintiff has no
right of action against the employer. . • . Therefore,
the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. . . .
Id.

Bihlmaier followed a line of Utah Supreme Court decisions

which had adopted as Utah law the "terminable at will" doctrine.

See Crane Company v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah
-4-

1978), (in the absence of a contract for a definite term, the
employer may fire an employee "whenever he desires"); Bullock
v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d
559, 562 (1960) (where an employment agreement contains no
statement on the length of time such employment should last,
"either party may terminate the employment at will"); Held v.
American Linen Supply Co., 6 Utah 2d 106, 307 P.2d 210, 211-12
(1957) ("In the absence of something in the contract of employment for a definite term . . . an employer may lawfully discharge an employee at what time he pleases and for what cause
he chooses, without thereby becoming liable to an action
against him.").
Two recent decisions of the United States District Court
for the District of Utah have acknowledged and applied the "at
will" doctrine as the law of Utah.

In Amos v. Corporation of

the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints, 594 F. Supp. 791 (D. Utah 1984), the federal court
quoted from Bihlmaier, supra, and observed that in the
Bihlmaier decision "the Utah Supreme Court continued to adhere
to the termination-at-will doctrine and implied that it would
not recognize a claim for wrongful discharge."

Id- at 829.

In

a Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Summary Judgment for
an employer-defendant in a wrongful discharge action, Heward v.
Western Electric Co., Inc., No. C-81-0904W, slip op. at 3-4 (D.
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Utah Feb. 18, 1983), the court concluded that "Utah law does
not recognize plaintiffs implied contract claims as legally
actionable, especially where the plaintiff's employment contract is indefinite as to duration and terminable at will." Id.
(emphasis added).
On its face, plaintiffs Verified Complaint alleges that
the employment agreement between plaintiff and defendant was of
indefinite duration.

For the purposes of a Motion to Dismiss,

such allegation must be accepted as true.

According to the law

in Utah, such an employment agreement is terminable at will by
either the employee or the employer, and, if terminated by the
employer, the employee has no cause of action for the discharge.
POINT II.
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT IS NOT TERMINABLE AT WILL, PLAINTIFF'S EXTENDED INABILITY TO PERFORM UNDER
THE AGREEMENT DISCHARGED OR TERMINATED THE
AGREEMENT AND/OR EXCUSED DEFENDANT'S NONPERFORMANCE.
Defendant Grand County School District hired bus drivers
for a nine-month period, generally referred to as a school
year.

In September of 1983, approximately one month after the

school year began, plaintiff injured her back and did not
return to work for the remainder of the school year.

On

January 31, four months after plaintiff was injured, defendant
advised plaintiff that defendant was hiring a full-time bus
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driver to replace plaintiff, but would continue plaintiffs
health insurance benefits through June.
It is a general rule of contract law that, in the absence
of a stipulation to the contrary, an employment contract for
personal services is terminated by the employee's sickness or
disability which renders the employee unable to perform his
contract.
114 (1965).

See 53 Am. Jur. 2d Master and Servant S 38, at p.
There can be little argument that where the sub-

ject matter of an employment agreement is the daily conveyance
of children to and from school over a long period of time,
"when the safety of these children and the necessity for the
exercise by the School District of great care in selecting a
trustworthy, competent and careful bus driver are taken into
consideration, such an agreement can only be for the personal
services of that particular bus driver."
Public Schools,

Or.

Folcruet v. Woodburn

, 29 P.2d 554, 446-57 (1934).

As in Folcruet, the employment agreement here in question was
one for the personal services of plaintiff.

By application of

law, plaintiffs inability to perform those services terminated
the employment agreement.
Application of this rule of law to factual circumstances
not dissimilar to the instant case is found in numerous jurisdictions.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming, in Fisher v. Church of

St. Mary, 497 P.2d 884 (Wyo. 1972), applied this rule to affirm
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a lower court's judgment for the defendant-employer where the
plaintiff-teacher contracted to teach in defendant16 school
system for ten months commencing August 31,J/1970, but on
November 12, suffered a cerebral hemorrhage and was unable to
resume her teaching duties prior to April 1, 1971.

Defendant

hired a full-time replacement commencing February 1, 1971. The
Wyoming court held that "contracts to perform personal acts"
are made on the implied condition that the parties will be
alive and capable of performing the contract, so that death or
disability, including sickness, "will operate as a discharge,
termination of the contract or excuse for nonperformance." IcL
at 884 (footnote and citations from five other jurisdictions
omitted).

The court added that "after the breach has become

material or the prospective incapacity is such as to justify
termination, the employer has an election to continue the contract or to terminate it."

Id.

Similar holdings are found in

Smith v. Bd. of Education of the Ft. Madison Community Sch.
Dist., 293 N.W.2d 221 (Iowa 1980); Shawsheen Dairy, Inc. v.
Keefe, 29 N.E.2d 159 (Mass. 1940); Rodriguez v. Civil Service
Commis'n, 582 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Citizens Home
Insurance Co. v. Glisson, 191 Va. 582, 61 S.E.2d 859 (1950);
Oneal v. Colton Consolidated Sch. Dist., 16 Wash. App. 488, 557
P.2d 11 (1976); see also Annotation 21 A.L.R. 2d 1247.
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The facts of the instant case showing plaintiff's inability
to perform her contract during the 1983-84 school year are even
more compelling than those of Fisher, supra, where plaintiff
could perform only 2% months of her ten month employment agreement.

Here, plaintiff performed approximately one month of her

nine-month school year contract.

In Fisher, the defendant

school district replaced plaintiff on February 1, after plaintiff had performed for 2% months, was then incapacitated for
another 2% months, and, at the time of replacement, with only
five months remaining on the contract, her prospective incapacity would extend at least until April 1, an additional two
months.

Here, plaintiff performed for one month of her nine-

month personal service contract, and by January 31, when her
part-time, temporary replacement was given full-time status,
four months had passed without performance, and plaintiff's
prospective incapacity (according to plaintiff) would extend
through the end of the contract period.

As in Fisher, plain-

tiff's personal services contract here, by application of law,
was terminated and defendant was discharged and excused from
performance when it elected not to continue the contract under
the circumstances.
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CONCLUSION
For the purposes of a Motion to Dismiss it must be assumed
that the allegations contained in plaintiffs Verified
Complaint are true.

The allegation that plaintiffs employment

contract with defendant was for an indefinite duration alleges
a terminable-at-will agreement, and, as a matter of law, under
such an agreement plaintiff has no cause of action for discharge.

In the alternative, assuming that plaintiffs allega-

tion of an indefinite contract duration is not true and a terminable-at-will contract therefore was not created, it must
follow that the contract duration was for a definite period—in
this case, the nine-month 1983-84 school year.

Under this

nine-month contract, plaintiffs inability to perform more than
one month of the required nine, as a matter of law, discharged
this defendant from performance of its obligations under that
same nine-month contract.
Therefore, plaintiffs Verified Complaint should be, and it
is hereby requested that it be, dismissed with prejudice, no
cause of action; or, in the alternative, because there is no
issue as to any material fact, and, by application of law,
defendant was discharged from performance, summary judgment
should be, and is hereby requested that it be, granted.
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DATED this

day of May, 1985.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN 8. MARTINEAU

AND BY

Robert H. Ruggeri
Attorneys for Defendant
SCM1545P
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EXHIBIT "A

ALLAN L. LARSON
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
ROBERT H. RUGGERI
P. O. Box 310
Moab, Utah 84532
Moab, Utah 84532
Telephone: (801) 259-5611
Attorneys for Defendant Grand
County School District

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOLENE L. WELCH,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
BILL D. MEADOR

VS.

GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT,

Civil No. 5233

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF GRAND

)
: ss.
)

BILL D. MEADOR, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.
forth.

I have personal knowledge of the facts herein set

2.

I am presently employed as the Superintendent of Grand

County School District, and was so employed in 1980 when the
plaintiff in the above-captioned lawsuit, Ms. Jolene Welch, was
first employed by the School District as a bus driver, and I
have continued in such employment from that time to the present.
3.
driver.

Ms. Welch was hired by the School District as a bus
This position was a "classified personnel" position,

and, according to the policies and procedures and common practice of the School District, was to last for one school year
• a period of nine months from the beginning of school in the
early fall to the end of school in the late spring.
4.

During the summer vacation months between the end of

the previous school year and the beginning of the next school
year, the School District sends a letter to each individual who
had been employed as a bus driver during the previous school
year, setting forth the salary offer for employment as a bus
driver for the next school year.

The letter instructs the

drivers to sign and return the letter by a specific date if
they desire to accept the offer of employment.

Such a letter

offering another nine-months1 employment as a bus driver was
sent each summer from 1981 through 1983, to Jolene Welch,
plaintiff in the above-captioned matter, and signed and
returned by her.

See copies of letters attached hereto as

Appendix "A",
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5*

In September of 1983, after Ms* Welch had signed and

returned the letter sent to her by the District, and thereby
accepted the offer of employment for the 1983-84 school year,
and had performed thereafter under the terms of the agreement
for approximately one month, plaintiff injured her back while
at work. Thereafter, she did not return to work for the
remainder of the school year.
6.

The School District hired a bus driver on a part-time

or temporary basis to cover Ms. Welch's route until she was
able to return to work.

Four months later, on January 31,

1984, I informed Ms. Welch that the School District would like
a bus driver on full-time status in order to give that driver
full benefits not otherwise available to part-time or temporary
employees.

Ms. Welch informed me at that time that she was

still under doctor's orders not to return to work, and that she
probably would not be permitted to return to work through the
remainder of that school year.
7.

Prom January 31, 1984 through the end of that school

year, Ms. Welch never informed me at any time that she was
ready, willing and physically able to return to work.
8.

In January of 1984, after the part-time, temporary bus

driver had, in effect, filled Ms. Welch's bus driver position
on a full-time basis for four months without full-time benefits, and in view of the continuing inability of Ms. Welch to
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resume her employment, it was decided that the part-time, temporary replacement for Ms. Welch should be given full-time
status and all the benefits associated therewith.

It was also

decided at that time to continue until June 30, 1984,
Ms. Welch's participation in the group health insurance plan
provided classified personnel employees of the School District.
9.

The copies of letters attached hereto and referred to

in paragraph 4, above, are true and accurate representations of
the letters on file in the administrative offices of Grand
County School District.
Further affiant saith not.
DATED this

day of May, 1985.

Bill D. Meador
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
1985.

Notary Public
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

SCM1541P
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day of Mayf

264 SOUTH 4th EAST. MOAB. UTAH 84532 • P.O. BOX 69 • TEL: 259-5317
BOARD OF EDUCATION
Batty Oalton
Pras.dant
flichard Garcia
V^caPresKJent
Vvonna Hawks
MichaalAraharl
Arthur ChWtH»f

,. SHI B. M M
Soptnnitnoe,
. ttmart Draw
Bus.ness Manag<

July 17, 1981

Jolene Welch
71 E. 3rd S.
Apt. 4*+*/

Moab, Utah
Dear Ms. Welch:
You indicated earlier this spring that you plan to return to
your present position for the school year 1981-82.
Your salary or hourly wage will be $476.80 per no* . If you
do, in fact, plan to return and accept the salary or hourly
terms, please sign this letter in the space provided and return
to your supervisor before
July 24. 1981
.
You may retain the blue copy of this letter for your records.
•Over 4 hours per day
$5.96 per hour

Sincerely,
^
Bill B. Meador
Superinterment

BBiVrg
Enclosure

>*£"'#&&&*>>'
'QttlUBE

QA/7 -£/

264 SOUTH 4TH EAST, MOAB, UTAH 84532 • TEL: 259-5317
JOARD OF EDUCATION
Ittty Oaftort
President
tichard Garcia
Vice President
late B Knight
Michael Arehart
Irthur Chidester

ailtB Mtador
Superintendent
Elmer E Dravege
Business Manager

June 17 r 1982

Jolene Welch
581 E. Mill Creek
Moab, Utah
Dear Miss Welch:
You indicated earlier this spring that you plan to return to
your present position for the school year 1982-83.
Your salary or hourly wage will be $ 524.80 per no . If you
do, in fact, plan to return and accept the salary or tourly
terms, please sign this letter in the space provided and return
to the School District Office before June 28, 1982
.
You may retain the blue copy of this letter for your records.

Sincerely,

\J%t^ g. Y)^^*
Bill B. Meador
Superintendent
Enclosure

2
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264 SOUTH 4TH EAST, MOAB, UTAH 84532 • TEL: 259-5317
BOARD OF EDUCATION
Silt B Meadi
Superintended
Elmar £. Oravafi
Business Manager

Michael*. Arthart
President
Nate B. Knight
Vice President
Arthur R.ChidttUr
Marion E. Holyoak
William J. Murphy

June 20, 1983

Jolene Welch
581 E. Mill Creek
Moab, Utah
Dear Miss Welch:
You indicated earlier this spring that you plan to return to
your present position for the school year 1983-84.
If you
Your salary or hourly wage will be $ 532.80
do, in fact, plan to return and accept the salary or hourly
terms, please sign this letter in the space provided and return
to your supervisor before
June 27, 1983
•
You may retain the blue copy of this letter for your records.
Sincerely,

Bill B. Meador
Superintendent
BB?Vrg
Enclosure
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DATE

*'-*?<*

APPE*

IN TKE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOh iHAM' COUN'",
STATE OF UTAH

JOLENE

WELCH,
IMai m i n ,

GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL

)
v
'
)
)

RULING ON MOTION
TO DISMISS, OR FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DISTRICT)

Defendant.

*

ri/Il No. 5233

In fliis cast-,,, the defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss
the Complaint, er in the Alternative, a it ti. n hi .stinuiia i , Judgment
and has 1

• •-

if Mi-itnn aiiduiu nl l-'ointfc arid Authorities in support

thereof, together with an Affidavit.

The plaintiff has filed no

Objection to the Motion or Counter-Affidavits

f thf> Pleadings and Affidavits on file

—
show that -

emorandum.

plaintiff entered into an annua'! contract nt rmployment

covering the nine month ptriod nl i U- 198i-"8A school year as a bus
diivir; t

t she suffered a

to perforn -•* • -

- ;/ *

the defendant to re 1

injury in September of 1983 and was unable
the contract, and that it twrmw

necessary for

mother employee to perform those duties

in January of 1984.
Under these facts, the concl

i

was justi f itj,rl in irrminaiing the employment c

* *
plaintiff lc

ne defendant
her inability

to perform, and that the defendant Is entitled to a Summary Judgment, of
No Cause of Action.

- 2 -

THEREFOR, the Court grants the Motion for Summary Judgment and
directs that the Attorney for the defendant prepare a formal Order to
that effect.
DATED this

-X

day of May, 1985.

•^'<y

BOYD BUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE

'/

/
/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

1 hereby I'ciiil v that I mailed true am1 correct copies
foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS, OR FOR SUMMARY Jt IXJME
depositing the same in the Hnireil Stau.s Mr.;!, postage* prepaid,
fill lowing i

Allan "L. "Larson, Esq. and
Christopher C. Fuller, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah
8411M
Robert H. Ruggeri, Esq.
Post Office Box 310
Moab, Utah
84!>32
Blair Woods, Esq.
C0FFMAN, COFFMAN & WOODS
59 East Center Street
Post Office Box 'J1
Moab, Utah
84532

DATED this Jtfhfday

of May, 1985.

entry No

filed

•

(TfOllS

Fee
Barbara Domenii

ALLAN L. LARSON
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

Clerk of Grand Courty

ROBERT H. RUGGERI
P. O. Box 310
Moab, UT 84532
Telephone: (801) 529-5611
Attorneys for Defendant
Grand County School District
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOLENE L. WELCH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VS.

GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Civil No. 5233

Defendant.
Defendant Grand County School District's Motion to Dismiss
or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, a Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in support thereof, together with an
Affidavit, were filed by defendant's counsel of record in the
above-referenced Court on the 13th day of May, 1985. Plaintiff
filed no Objection to the Motion or Counter-Affidavits or
Memorandum.
The Court having reviewed, examined and considered the
Pleadings, Affidavit and Memorandum on file, having previously

—

issued a Ruling on Motion to Dismiss, ox loi Summary Judgment ,
and being fully advised in the piemi ses:
T>»" Cc «ui t fu"." 'p." plaintiff entered into an annual
contract of employment with defendant Grand County School
District covering the nine innritli |»'i m d m
/?
September

the I 9 8 3 -- 1^84 school

iver; that plaintiff suffered an injury in
and was unable to perform her emplr

under the contract; and

ti'c"'1 u

r

Hu-ditie necessary r. -

tie fendar.t to replace plaintiff with another employee :r January
of 1984 ft) perform those duties.
matter of Law tha1 Hn

The Court

ricfentiant Liaini

»i -

County School District

was justified in terminating the employment of plaintiff for
her inability to perform, and that tht» defendant

is entitled

to a Summary Judgment ul No Cause of Action.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that defendant Grand County
School District's Motion for Summary .iudqiTii.-nt be, and hereby is,
granted.
DATED this

£0

day of June, 1985.
IV," TUT COURT:
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
2

SS •

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Susan C. Brown, being duly sworn, says that she is
employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau,
attorneys for

defendant

herein; that she served the attached

(Case Number

5233

Grand

County) upon

the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy
thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Aldine J. Coffman, Jr.
COFFMAN & COFFMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
P. O. Drawer J
Moab, UT 84532-1371
Robert H. Ruggeri
P. 0. Box 310
Moab, UT 84532

and causing the same to be mailed first class,
on the

31st day of

May

postage

prepaid,

, 1985.

tykkA_ G> PxifaJJ^J
Susan C. Brown
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 31st
May

day of

, 1985^

ission Expires ^^/-^Residing in th^State of Utah
sT* r V

APPENDIX "E"

D

COFFMAN, c o F F M A N , t
Aldine J . Coffman, Jr.
59 East Center Street
Drawer J
Moab, Utah 84532-1371
Telephone:
(801)259-5102
A t t o r n e y s *-

C.

Plaintiff
HI SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IM AMD FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATL «'»' i i ] ivi i
JOLENE L. WELCH,
LIV1L HO. 5233
Plaintiff,
REQUEST FOR HEARING
MOTION TO SET ASIDE
ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v~
GRAND COUNTY
SCHOOL D I S T R I C T ,
Defendant,
COMES

NOW,

-ecord, Aldine ,1
Woods
Granting

•.Summa^

Jolene

!

through

Coffmar

Coffman, Coffman,

ursuant

ine M L

udgment

eH

K

*

Objection thereto filed by the Defendan*
a Hearing
regular

on Ihp matter

be sex i

nb.;i*
^laintiff,

and

t

rder
the

respectfully requests that
""• following

the

\v\ aiif I Mi.1 u»f. calendar.
DATED this 1st day ol J u l y . 1985, A . D .

\9 J r .
'Coffman, Coffman & Woods. P C,
Attorneys JPor Plaintiff
L/

NOTICE OF REQUEST FOR HEARING
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Counsel for the Plaintiff
will bring the foregoing "REQUEST FOR HEARING ON MOTION TO
SET ASIDE ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT" to be heard
on the 8th day of July, A . D . 1985.
DATED this 1st day

y/Coffman, Co^fman 6 Woods, P.C.
Attorneys/for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF MAJLING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing "REQUEST FOR HEARING ON MOTION TO
SET ASIDE ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, postage
prepaid, this 1st day of July, A . D . 1985, addressed as follows:
Allan L. Larson, Esq.
Christopher C. FuHer, Esq.
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Robert H. Ruggeri
Post Office Box 310
Moab, Utah 84532
Honorable Boyd Bunnell
District Court Judge
Court House Building
Price, Utah 84501

retarytoCOF^FM
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THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

JOLENE

Plaintiff,

N O T I C E O F HEARING

vs.
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.

TO:

Aldine J. Coffman, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff

Civil M r p >?'^

Allan L. Larson, Christopher C. Fuller
and Robert H. Ruggeri
Attorneys for Defendant

YOU, and each of you, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, and you are hereby notified that the
above entitled case has been set K^XZPm(AX^m}jaS%XtK)M^O(K&XK)»K, to be heard on
JULY 31, 1985 to follow the Law and Motion calenda: r

10 a.m.

in the Courtroom of the above entitled Court at Moab, Grand County, Stat? <
Please govern yourselves accordingly.
Dated this

9th

day of

July

, A.D., 19 85

BARBARA

McGann,

ICK,

Clerk

Deputy Court Clerk
Grand County
125 East Center
Moab, Utah 84532

APPENDIX "F"

COFFMAN, COFFMAN & WOODS, P.C.
Aldine J . Coffman, Jr.
59 East Center Street
Post Office Drawer J
Moab, Utah 84532-1371
Telephone: (801)259-5102
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOLENE L. WELCH,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO. 5233

vs.
AFFIDAVIT
CRAND COUNTY
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant,

STATE OF UTAH
County of Grand
NOW COMES your Affiant, JOLENE L. WELCH, the
Plaintiff herein, and being first duly sworn, on oath, deposes and
states as follows:
1.

That she is the Plaintiff in this case.

2.

That she did have a contract to drive a Grand

County School bus for the 1983-1981 school year.

3.

T h a t she was i n j u r e d i n September, 1983 and

was under doctor's o r d e r s not to r e t u r n to w o r k .
4.
Superintendent

T h a t she kept in contact w i t h the School Board

and

in J a n u a r y ,

1984,

he advised

her

that

she

would be terminated.
5.

T h a t although y o u r A f f i a n t was advised at t h e

January meeting t h a t she would be t e r m i n a t e d , she was given no
blue s l i p .

She was told t h a t she would be g i v e n a blue slip in May

and her medical benefits were continued u n t i l May.
6.
time

offered

to

That
the

the

School

Plaintiff

a

Board

contract

Superintendent
for

the

school

at

no

year

1984-1985, even t h o u g h b y A u g u s t , 1984 she was able and willing to
r e t u r n to w o r k , and was otherwise able to enter into negotiations to
renew her c o n t r a c t .
7.
unterminated

I t was t h e policy o f t h e School Board to g i v e

school

bus

drivers

the

first

right

contracts before other bus d r i v e r s were h i r e d .

to

renew

their

T h i s policy was the

practice of the School Board before and d u r i n g the employment of
t h e Plaintiff.

In the case at p o i n t , at the time t h a t the school bus

contract should have been offered to the P l a i n t i f f ,

when she was,

physically able to r e t u r n to w o r k , the School Board Superintendent
elected to discharge

her

without

just

cause

violation of the practices of the School B o a r d .
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or

just

reason,

in

8.

At no time was your Affiant/Plaintiff advised of

the decision in January to replace her with a full time driver rather
than a part time driver who would have full times status and all the
benefits and that she would be -terminated in January.

Further,

the Affiant represents that she advised the School Board through
her employer and supervisor of her regular attendance on medical
treatment and when she anticipated to be able to return to work.
DATED this £

*) day of July, 1985.

fene L. Welch

Subscribed and sworn to before me t h i s t ^ f f i d a y of
July, A.D. 1985.

^M^^^

Residing at Moab, Utah 84532

My commission expires:

//-/A/g
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COFFMAN, COFFMAN 6 WOODS, P.C.
Aldine J . Coffman, Jr.
59 East Center Street
Post Office Drawer J
Moab, Utah 84532-1371
Telephone: (801)259-5102
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOLENE L. WELCH,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO. 5233

vs.
GRAND COUNTY
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF REQUEST FOR HEARING
ON MOTION TO SET ASIDE
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is
based primarily upon the supposition that the Plaintiff was a driver
for employment at wiJJ because "she was employed for an indefinite
term".

The facts of the case rather indicate that the employee,

Jolene L. Welch, was an employee by contract for the school year,
and that as a contract employee for the school year she was
regularly and systematically offered the first right of refusal to

renew that contract year to year.

Indeed, she Is not an employee

at will in the sense that at any time during the school year she
could be terminated without cause and such a termination would be
a violation of the employment contract that existed between the
Plaintiff and the School District.
The law respecting the discharge of an employee at
will is undergoing a rapid acceleration of change.
issue of the American

The current

Bar Association Journal, August,

1985,

contains an article summarizing the rapid evolution in this field.
The law review The Business Lawyer published by the Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law, American Bar Association,
1984, contains

perhaps

Wrongful Discharge".

the article on

"The

Emerging

Law

of

Through May, 1984, thirty (30) of the fifty

(50) states had Joined the evolving law recognizing an implied
obligation of an employer to terminate an employee at will, only for
good cause, and that the absolute right of termination would be in
violation of public policy, see article, page 1 .

Since May, 1984,

other courts have brought the common law of their states In line,
most notably New Jersey, and in the summer of 1985, the State of
Utah to the extent that it improved the standards of definition for
termination

of

employees

for

cause

in

the

unemployment

compensation regulations, Kehl v. Bd. of Review of the tndust.
Common., No. 20913, Slip op., (Utah May 23, 1985).

•2-

While the

courts themselves have grouped their grounds for so holding into
various theories, the most common of the theories is summarized in
the volume Employment Dismissal and Practice Law published by
John Wiley t

Sons, 1984, under

Relating to Dismissal.
employee

dismissal

Chapter 4,

Contract Theories

The tort theories and their application to

cases

is

the

subject

of

Chapter

5.

The

supplement to that volume recognizes that in 1984 Alabama, Arizona,
Kentucky, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Montana, Nevada,
Oklahoma, and Washington each joined, in one way or another, the
growing

list

of

states

recognizing

that

employer

practices,

procedures or policies, both written and unwritten, govern the
employee relationship in contradistinction to the common law concept
of

termination

without

cause

of

an

employee

at

will

and,

consequently, in one manner or another, broaden the rights of an
employee.
The
Plaintiffs

Defendant's

primary

argument

contract of employment is terminable at

is

that

will.

the
Their

second point is that the Plaintiffs inability to perform due to illness
granted a right to terminate.
Neither argument is material to the facts.

The

Plaintiff was employed under a contract for a specific period of time
and that contract was indefinitely renewable so long as the Plaintiff
adequately performed.

Termination is represented to have occurred
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in January by the Defendant, in the middle of the contract period
though no blue slip was given at that time and the

Plaintiffs

employment benefits continued until May, at which time the Plaintiff
was given her termination papers.

The Plaintiffs extended inability

was cured by the time she was terminated and, thus, the argument
that her extended inability would have precluded her performance,
at the time of actual termination, is an error in the law and in fact.
There are genuine disputes
Court.

of

fact

before the

The Plaintiff denies she was terminated in January.

The

documentary evidence shows that she was, in fact, not terminated
in January, but in May.

The failure to offer her a renewal of her

contract, when she was physically able and willing to do so, merely
because the School Board Superintendent thought he had fired her
in January, is an administrative bumbling on the Defendant's side
and cannot represent a prejudice to the Plaintiff.
The triable issues in this case are when did the
School Board actually terminate Ms. Welch, and what were the
school policies with respect to the renewal of contracts to school
bus drivers.

There is a sufficient conflict in the Affidavits filed

and In the representations of the evidence to be hearqj by the
Court that this matter must proceed to trial.

APPENDIX "G"

ALLAN L. LARSON
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
ROBERT H. RUGGERI
P. 0. Box 310
Moab, Utah 84532
Telephone: (801) 259-5611
Attorneys for Defendant Grand
County School District
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOLENE L. WELCH,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO STRIKE
AFFIDAVIT

vs.
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT,

Civil No. 5233

Defendant.
Defendant Grand County School District, by and through its
counsel of record, moves the Court to strike the Affidavit of
Jolene L. Welch, dated July 29, 1985, on the grounds that information sworn to by said affiant in paragraph 7 of said Affidavit
is outside the realm of personal knowledge of said affiant and
is directly contrary to documents filed in the above-referenced
matter by this defendant, which documents were created in the
ordinary course of this defendant's business, pursuant to regulations requiring same, and the accuracy of said documents having

-1-

been sworn to by competent Affidavit of the Superintendent of
defendant.

Plaintiff's Affidavit has not affirmatively shown

that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters so
stated in paragraph 7.

For these reasons the information as

sworn is not admissible in evidence.

The Affidavit, failing to

meet the requirements of competency set forth in Rule 56(e),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, should therefore be, and it is
hereby respectfully requested that it be, struck.
DATED this

1*

day of August, 1985.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

yLarson
Jher C. Fuller
AND BY

Robert H. Ruggeri
Attorneys for Defendant
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ALLAN L. LARSON
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
ROBERT H. RUGGERI
P. O. Box 310
Moab, Utah 84532
Telephone: (801) 259-5611
Attorneys for Defendant Grand
County School District

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOLENE L. WELCH,
Plaintiff,

REPLY MEMORANDUM

vs.
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT,

Civil No. 5233

Defendant.

Defendant Grand County School District, by and through its
counsel of record, submits the following Memorandum in reply to
plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Request for Hearing on
Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Summary Judgment.

ARGUMENT
In her Memorandum in Support of Request for Hearing on
Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Summary Judgment, plaintiff
admits that the employment contract in question in the abovereferenced case was a contract for a definite term, that is,
one school year in duration.

Plaintiff contends that she was

not terminated until May of that contract year, nine months
after she was injured and could no longer perform her contracted employment responsibilities.

Assuming, arguendo, that

plaintiffs contention, that she was terminated in May rather
than January of the contract year, is accurate, such contention
does not change the determination made by this Court that
plaintiff failed to perform under the terms of the contract,
and that this defendant was thus justified in replacing plaintiff with a bus driver who could perform the services required.
Whether terminated in January or May, plaintiff has
provided no evidence that would suggest that she could have
performed under the contract terms during the contract year in
question.

It is undisputed that plaintiff had entered into a

contract to drive a bus for defendant, that after the first
month of the contract period plaintiff was injured and could
not continue her bus driving duties, and that defendant waited
at least until the following January, when plaintiff informed
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defendant that plaintiff could not return to work for the
remainder of the contract term, before replacing plaintiff with
a permanent, rather than part-time, driver.

During the term of

the contract, defendant never received medical authorization
from plaintiff's physician stating that plaintiff was physically capable of returning to work.
Thus, according to the law as set forth in defendant's
Memorandum in Support of Notion for Summary Judgment, and as
applied by this Court in its Ruling and Order Granting Summary
Judgment in favor of defendant, this defendant was legally
justified in terminating the employment of plaintiff for plaintiffs inability to perform under the terms of the employment
contract, and this Court's Summary Judgment was proper.

Nei-

ther Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Request for Hearing
on Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Summary Judgment nor the
accompanying Affidavit of plaintiff set forth any facts, evidence, or case law authority which requires reconsideration,
further argument or hearing before this Court on this matter.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, and in defendant's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and as
explained in this Court's Ruling and Order Granting Summary
Judgment, the Summary Judgment ordered, decreed and adjudged by

-3-

this Court in favor of this defendant was proper and should not
be set aside.
DATED this

*r

day of August, 1985.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Christopher C. Fuller
AND BY

Robert H. Ruggeri
Attorneys for Defendant
SCK1680P
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APPENDIX "H"

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
JOLENE L. WELCH,
Plaintiff,

)}
.
''
•

RULING UPON
RECONSIDERATION OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

V.
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, ;
Defendant.

'1

Civil No. 5233

The Court has previously granted the defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment to which the plaintiff had filed no objection.
Thereafter, the Court determined that the plaintiff's failure to
respond to the Motion was excusable and allowed the plaintiff to
submit her objection to the Motion and Counter-Affidavits and Memorandum
of Points and Authorities, and the Court agreed to reconsider its prior
ruling.
The defendant has now moved to strike Paragraph 7 of plaintiff's
Affidavit, and the Court grants the Motion and ORDERS THAT Paragraph 7 of
the plaintiff's Affidavit be stricken on the ground that it states a
conclusion not supported by sufficient foundation of personal knowledge.
After a re-examination of the affidavits, exhibits and other
pleadings, the Court finds no dispute of fact that the plaintiff, because
of her physicial disability, was unable to perform her employment under
the agreement, and that the defendant was justified in terminating her
employment.

The Court, THEREFORE, GRANTS THE Motion of Summary Judgment
of Dismissal in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, and
the Court directs that the Attorney for the defendant prepare a new
Judgment of Dismissal in accordance with this opinion.
DATED this

&

day of September, 1985.

-Page Two-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of
the foregoing RULING UPON RECONSIDERATION OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
by depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to
the following:
A. J. Coffman
COFFMAN, COFFMAN & WOODS
Attorneys at Lav
Post Office Box J
Moab, Utah
84532
Allen L. Larson
Christopher C. Fuller
SNOW, CKRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place> Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Robert H. Ruggeri
Attorney at Law
Post Office Box 310
Moab, Utah
84532

PATED this £>T/i

day of September, 1985.

Secretary

APPENDIX "I"

ALLAN L. LARSON
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN 6 MARTINEAU
10 Exchange P l a c e , E l e v e n t h F l o o r
P o s t O f f i c e Box 3000
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84110
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 5 2 1 - 9 0 0 0
ROBERT H .

RUGGERI

g*~u*
*7? W 0
SZid-fe
™a—J"rT *
Me

Barbara Dorm

Clerk of Grand County

P. O. Box 310
Moab, Utah 84532
Telephone: (801) 259-5611
Attorneys for Defendant Grand
County School District
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOLENE L. WELCH,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT,

Civil No. 5233

Defendant.
Defendant Grand County School District's Motion to Dismiss,
or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in support thereof, together with an
Affidavit, were filed by defendant's counsel of record in the
above-referenced Court on the 13th day of May, 1985.

Plaintiff

filed no objection to the Motion or Counter-Affidavit or Memorandum.

On May 28, 1985, this Court issued a Ruling granting

defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and on June 10, 1985,
signed an Order Granting Summary Judgment in favor of defendant
Grand County School District.
-1-

On June 19, 1985r plaintiff filed a Motion to Set Aside
Summary Judgment, accompanied by an Affidavit from plaintiff's
counsel and a Memorandum.

Defendant subsequently filed an

Objection to Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Order Granting
Summary Judgment, accompanied by a Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition thereto.
On July 31, 1985, pursuant to proper Notice, arguments
were heard before this Court on plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside
Order Granting Summary Judgment, both parties being represented
by counsel of record.

At said hearing plaintiff presented to the

Court am Affidavit signed by plaintiff and a Memorandum prepared
by plaintiff's counsel.

Within seven days, defendant filed a

Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Affidavit and a Reply Memorandum
in response to plaintiff's Memorandum of July 31, 1985.
By Ruling of this Court on September 6, 1985, defendant's
Motion to Strike was granted such that paragraph 7 of plaintiff's
Affidavit was stricken on the ground that said paragraph states
a conclusion not supported by sufficient foundation of personal
knowledge.
WHEREFORE, the Court having re-examined the affidavits,
exhibits, pleadings and memoranda on file, having earlier issued
a

Ruling and entered an Order Granting Summary Judgment in favor

of defendant, having heard argument of counsel with regard to
setting aside said Summary Judgment, having issued a second
Ruling also in favor of defendant, and being fully advised in
the premises:
The Court concludes that there exists no dispute of material
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fact that plaintiff, because of her physical disability, was
unable to perform her employment under the employment agreement
entered into with defendant; that defendant was thereby justified in terminating her employment; and that, as a matter of
law, summary judgment should be granted in favor of defendant,
no cause of action;
NOW, THEBEFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
plaintiff9s Complaint be, and the same hereby is, dismissed
with prejudice and upon the merits, and judgment is hereby
entered in favor of defendant and against the plaintiff, no
cause of action.
DATED t h i s ^ ^ J ? day of
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BY THE COURT:
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, 1985.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Respondent's
Brief by mailing four copies to Penelope D. Coffman at Coffman
& Coffman, Attorneys for Appellant, at 59 East Center Street,
Drawer J, Moab, Utah 84532-1371, this 8th day of January,
1986.
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